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Abstract 
 
An Evaluation of the Standard Setting Performance of the FASB 
 
by 
 
Devon Rolleri 
 
 
Adviser: Professor Edward Li 
 
This paper develops a framework for evaluating the effects of various organizational 
changes on the performance of a regulatory agency in standard setting.  I apply this framework to 
examine whether numerous Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) modifications 
influence the performance of the Board during the standard setting process.  These modifications 
include changes in FASB funding, voting, and Board member characteristics, particularly 
professional backgrounds and political affiliations.  To analyze the performance of the Board, I 
follow the operations management literature to construct a set of variables that capture team 
effectiveness and managerial performance.  A factor analysis on these variables produces three 
distinct efficiency factors regarding FASB standard setting: thoroughness, timeliness, and 
consensus.  I find evidence that a change in voting rules from super majority to simple majority 
is associated with an improvement in timeliness but a decline in thoroughness and consensus.  I 
also find that a change in FASB funding from voluntary contributions to mandatory accounting 
support fees is associated with reduced timeliness but no significant change in thoroughness and 
consensus.  Finally, FASB members’ professional and political characteristics appear to 
influence the efficiency of the Board in different aspects. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
1.1 Regulatory Evaluation 
In recent years, as part of the response to the financial crisis, there has been an increase in 
the demand for government accountability and the need to monitor regulatory performance 
(GAO, 2013).  This type of evaluation is a crucial component of public policy and can provide 
valuable opportunities for governments and regulatory agencies to improve and learn.   
Evaluating regulatory agencies is an especially difficult task, given the many variations in 
the type and form of regulators, as well as the high level of detail and subjectivity involved.  
These evaluations involve comprehensive tasks such as reviewing the independence and 
accountability of the organization, the relationship between the regulator and policymakers, the 
formal decision-making process, the transparency of the decision-making process, as well as the 
organizational structure and resource utilization of the regulator (Brown et al., 2006). 
Additionally, an evaluator must also consider the goals, outcomes, and objectives of each 
individual organization.  Moreover, due to the specific nature of their work, it is often impossible 
to compare the performance of one regulator with a similar agency.  
However, when investigated further, one can see a broad pattern emerge in the 
assessment of regulatory organizations.  These organizations are typically subject to systematic, 
independent, and publicly available performance evaluations1.  These evaluations are meant to 
provide a mechanism for ensuring accountability and improving the design and performance of 
existing systems within a regulator.  Regardless of the difficulties in evaluating the performance 
                                                
1 For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is subject to a peer review 
every three years (www.gao.gov), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is subject to 
audits, evaluations, and investigations by the EPA’s Office Inspector General (www2.epa.gov), 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is subject to Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations (www.treasury.gov), and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is subject to Office Inspector General (OIG) audits, reviews, 
inspections, and evaluations (www.ftc.gov). 
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of these organizations, the demand for this type of review continues to grow.  This paper 
cultivates a framework for systematically quantifying the output of a regulatory agency, 
regardless of the specific industry or regulator under review.   
Within the financial sector, there are countless regulatory agencies subject to varying 
levels of oversight. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission is audited by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) every three years, while the Federal Reserve System 
is subject to near constant oversight by: 1.) Congress, who can call governors and Board staff to 
testify before the Senate and the House of Representatives, 2.) the Board of Governors’ Office of 
Inspector General, which conducts and supervises independent audits, investigations and reviews 
of Fed programs, and 3.) the GAO, which retains the broad authority to review and audit the 
Federal Reserve activities2.   
Other financial regulators face less prescribed, official oversight, including the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the private, non-profit regulatory agency tasked with 
establishing and improving generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) within the U.S.  
This paper targets the FASB because of its unique regulatory process, which lacks the formal 
review, oversight, or other performance measures mandated in other financial sector agencies.      
 
1.2 Background 
The significance of the FASB’s work is evidenced by the large body of constituents who 
participate in, attempt to influence, and are ultimately subject to the standards it sets.  In the 
words of former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford, “Do changes in accounting standards cause 
behavioral changes?  Of course they do.  If no one acted differently as a result of new standards, 
why bother?” (1997).  Awareness of the FASB’s importance has grown in tandem with the 
                                                
2 www.sec.gov, www.federalreserve.gov. 
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awareness that publicly reported accounting information has the power to influence behavior, 
and therefore has the potential to impact stock prices, management decisions, executive 
compensation and other important outcomes in the business community (Van Riper and Ebrary, 
1994).  In addition to influencing behavior, there is some evidence that the restrictive nature of 
accounting standards can increase the social value of public information (Chen et al., 2014).       
The FASB recognizes the merits of efficient accounting regulation, and acknowledges 
that poorly designed, implemented or politically driven standards can have significant economic 
impacts.  This was emphasized by the current Chairman of the FASB Russell G. Golden, when 
he outlined the Board’s top priorities for the future, stating, “First, I believe we need to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of our operations… [through] evaluating our agenda decision 
process, improving the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, and seeing if we can short the 
life cycle of our projects while enhancing quality” (2013).  It’s clear the Board wants to operate 
more efficiently; however, with numerous objectives and diverse constituent groups, setting 
accounting standards is a careful balancing act.     
Despite the importance of the FASB in accounting regulation, it has consistently faced 
limited oversight. The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Board of Trustees “…have the 
responsibility to periodically review the structure and governance [of the FASB] to assess its 
effectiveness and efficiency” (FAF, 2008)3.  Additionally, the FAF is responsible for reviewing, 
approving, and overseeing the annual performance evaluations for each Board member.  Aside 
from the FAF, the FASB is monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
                                                
3 The Board of Trustees of the FAF is selected by a group of constituent organizations including 
the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Charted Financial Analysis Institute, Financial Executives International, Government Finance 
Officers Association, Institute of Management Accountants, National Association of State 
Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasures, and Securities Industry Association 
(www.accountingfoundation.org).   
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formally outsourced the job of setting accounting standards to the Board in 19734.  Although the 
SEC retains the statutory authority to establish financial accounting and reporting standards, the 
Commission has consistently looked to the FASB for this function.  Given that the FASB is able 
to, “…define the grammar of accounting practice as well as accounting rules and principles, and 
thus exert considerable influence on observed financial reporting” (Kothari et al., 2010),  it is 
important to subject the FASB to the same level of scrutiny as other political and regulatory 
organizations.  
Over its 43 year life, the FASB has periodically considered and implemented various 
structural and organizational changes aimed at improving performance.  Examples of these 
changes include funding, voting, Board size, agenda formation, due process, etc.  Because of the 
limited amount of FASB oversight, the effects of these organizational changes on the accounting 
regulatory process are not known.  I examine three of these changes in the context of FASB 
performance.        
The first organizational change I investigate is the change in the funding mechanism of 
the Board provided by the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) in 2002.  From 1973 – 2003, the 
FASB was privately funded through contributions from various sources, including the public 
accounting profession, industrial companies, banks, and financial institutions.  In exchange for 
contributing, donors received subscriptions to FASB publications, statements, standards, etc. 
(FAF, 2002).  The continued operation of the Board during this time was dependent on these 
contributions, and donors had no obligation to continue contributing, or to increase contributions 
from year to year.   
                                                
4 The Commission retains the right to establish accounting standards if the FASB fails to act 
within a reasonable time or if fair presentation of financial information is not achieved. 
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In 2002, the passage of SOX permanently altered the funding structure of the FASB by 
creating a federally mandated fee system, assessed against and collected from all issuers of 
securities, as defined by the Act.  This support fee system fundamentally altered how the FASB 
is financed, and for practical purposes changed it from a privately funded organization to a 
publicly subsidized one.  The objective of this financial modification was to provide the FASB 
with, “…an independent, stable source of funding, subject to review by the Commission” (SOX, 
2002).  The accounting support fees provide for the cash flow needs of the Board, including all 
recoverable expenses5 and are based on the Board’s operating and capital budget for each 
calendar year.  The fees are assessed, allocated, and collected based on the average market 
capitalization of each user.  All contribution types6 were discontinued for the FASB in 2003, the 
first year the Board collected accounting support fees (FAF, 2004).  Subscriptions and 
publications still provide about one third of the FASB’s total revenue, however the substantial 
majority of funding comes from support fees.     
The funding change from voluntary contributions to mandatory accounting support fees 
has far-reaching repercussions for both the FASB and all issuers of securities.  From an issuer 
perspective, these fees are not insignificant and represent an additional cost of listing on a U.S. 
exchange; in 2008, the FASB collected almost $24 million from over 7,000 publicly traded 
companies (FAF, 2008).  For the FASB, this change represents both a financial windfall and a 
potential threat to its independence.  While the budget under the previous funding system was 
smaller and not guaranteed, the Board was free to spend the contributions however it saw fit.  
Now, the accounting support fee system is authorized by SOX and the total budget is larger, but 
                                                
5 Recoverable expenses are the total FASB operating expenses adjusted to excluded non-cash 
expenses and include other cash requirements.  Recoverable expenses are approximately 
equivalent to operating expenses (www.accountingfoundation.org). 
6 With the exception of contributed services of FAF members. 
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there are some strings attached.  After SOX passed, the SEC re-confirmed the status of the FASB 
as the designated private-sector body responsible for setting authoritative accounting standards, 
and re-emphasized its role in monitoring the activities of the FAF and the FASB.  These 
monitoring activities include approving the FASB’s budget and providing input on the Board’s 
activities and appointments, which has the potential to create complications for the Board in the 
future (SEC, 2003a)7.   
The second organizational change I investigate involves the number of affirmative votes 
required by the Board to approve a standard.  This number has been altered three times by the 
FAF to date.  In 1973, the voting requirement was originally set at a super majority, requiring at 
least five of seven votes in order to approve a proposal.  In 1977, amidst Congressional concerns 
that the FASB was not acting quickly enough to meet financial reporting needs, the vote was 
lowered to a simple majority, requiring at least four of seven for approval8 (SEC Historical 
Society, 2014).  Then, after considerable debate, the super majority vote was reinstated in 19919.   
                                                
7 For example, in 2007, the Office of the Chief Accountant refused to sign off on the FASB’s 
budget until the FAF agreed to allow the SEC more say in the appointments of FASB members 
and FAF trustees, and that same year, the SEC also refused a pay increase for a Board member 
citing that it wasn’t in line with increases at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) (Rappeport and Leone, 2007).  More recently, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) determined that the FASB’s spending of accounting support fees is sequestrable under 
the Budget Control Act of 2011 (SEC, 2015).  A final example of limitations on the FASB’s 
spending of accounting support fees occurred in 2013, when the National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) raised questions and asked for a detailed explanation of a $3 
million payment from the FAF to the IFRS foundation.  The NASBA questioned the 
“appropriateness” of redirecting corporate funds to the IASB, since it is not even recognized as 
an authoritative standard setter for U.S. public companies (Thomson Reuters, 2014).     
8 Reasons provided for changing the voting to a simple majority include: increasing efficiency 
and changing the Board composition and voting blocks. 
9 Reasons provided for reinstating the supermajority include: improving the acceptability of the 
standards by improving the process of consensus building, making up for the lack of recourse to 
the FASB’s decisions, and providing stability when simplifying the literature (through the 
revision of existing standards).  Additionally, the change to the super majority voting 
requirement was an attempt to slow down the issuance of controversial statements (SEC 
Historical Museum).  
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Most recently, in 2002, the voting requirement was reduced back down to the simple majority.  
At the time, the FASB was under heavy criticism in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, 
particularly for being slow to act and failing to address the issue of Special Purpose Entities on 
corporate financial statements.  The FAF approved the adjustment to a simple majority vote and 
claimed, “…a change from a five-to-two from a four-to-three member voting requirement would 
make for a more efficient process without compromising the quality of the FASB’s standard 
setting process” (FASB, 2002).  
These voting changes directly affect the outcomes of decisions by the FASB, and 
changing the number of affirmative votes required to pass a standard has some important 
implications.  For example, the simple majority vote requires a lower level of agreement from 
the Board to pass a standard, which can decrease the time taken to issue standards and potentially 
increase the FASB’s level of output.  Additionally, outside parties looking to influence the 
standard setting process can attempt to do so by means such as lobbying, governmental control, 
influencing Board membership, funding favorable research, or financing the FAF, and requiring 
fewer (more) votes means that fewer(more) Board members need to be influenced in order to 
sway the pronouncement process (Pasewark, 2000).  
The third FASB mechanism I explore is the change in Board member characteristics on 
the standard setting process.  These characteristics include members’ professional backgrounds 
and political affiliations.  Initially, the By-Laws of the FAF required that four of the seven FASB 
members came from public accounting backgrounds, and that the remaining three members 
should come from other, more diverse backgrounds10 (FAF Structure Committee, 1983).  This 
requirement was removed from the By-Laws in 1978, and since then the composition of the 
                                                
10 The three non-public accounting members of the original FASB included a financial executive, 
an academician, and a Federal government official. 
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Board has typically included three or four members from public accounting, one or two from 
industry, one from academia, and one from regulation.  According to the FASB, the present 
requirement is that each member has, “a concern for investor and public interest in matters of 
financial accounting and reporting”, and that they collectively possess, “knowledge of and 
experience in investing, accounting, finance, business, accounting, education and research” (FAF 
by-law, Chapter A, Article II-A, Section 2. 2014).  Additionally, since the FASB is a non-
governmental organization, its political makeup and the affiliations of its members have varied 
over time.        
In this paper, I examine whether the above mentioned Board changes and member 
characteristics impact the performance of the FASB in the standard setting process.  The cost of 
the FASB is ultimately carried by publicly traded companies in the U.S., and thus it is in 
everyone’s interest to ensure the resulting standard setting process is as efficient and effective as 
possible.  However, the FASB’s numerous objectives and broad constituent base make this 
difficult.  For example, the amount of time taken to generate and issue a standard is often at odds 
with the degree of complexity and detail that is desired by constituents and required to achieve 
the necessary level of agreement among Board members.  For the purpose of this paper, I 
examine FASB performance in the context of efficiency, where efficiency is defined as the 
ability of the Board to produce high quality accounting standards without wasting resources, 
such as money, time, or energy.  Efficiency is closely linked to effectiveness, which I define as 
the ability of the FASB to produce high quality standards of financial accounting11.  
Nevertheless, I am interested in the FASB’s role throughout the standard setting process, not just 
                                                
11 A common way of distinguishing between efficiency and effectiveness is the saying, 
“Efficiency is doing things right, while effectiveness is doing the right things” (Drucker, 1993). 
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the resulting pronouncements, therefore in the forthcoming analysis I focus on efficiency, for 
which I construct a quantitative measure, determined by empirical statistical analysis. 
I use a two-stage approach to analyze the efficiency of the FASB in accounting 
regulation.  First, I employ exploratory factor analysis to identify key underlying constructs from 
a set of variables, based upon scales of team effectiveness and managerial performance from 
Kathuria and Davis (2001) and Chong and Mahama (2013)12.  Second, I perform a regression 
analysis on the retained efficiency factors. 
Overall, I find evidence that the FASB funding change from voluntary contributions to 
mandatory accounting support fees and the change from super majority voting to simple majority 
voting are associated with decreases in FASB efficiency.  Additionally, FASB members’ 
professional and political characteristics do appear to significantly influence the efficiency of the 
Board during the standard setting process.    
The motivation of this study is to subject the FASB to the same level of analysis and 
oversight as other political and regulatory organizations.  Given that the FASB’s predecessors, 
including the Committee on Accounting Procedure (1936-1959) and more recently the 
Accounting Principles Board (1959-1973) were so short-lived, I’m interested in investigating 
why the FASB has survived, and how it compares to other, similar organizations.  Previous 
studies on the FASB have focused on the evaluation of economic outcomes rather than the 
                                                
12 Kathuria and Davis (2001) use data from multiple levels of employees in manufacturing units 
in different industries and test how managerial performance impacts the synergy in work force 
management practices and the quality emphasis.  They find that managers who strongly 
demonstrate certain management practices while emphasizing high quality are perceived as 
better performers.    
 
Chong and Mahama (2013) study the impact of interactive and diagnostic uses of budgets on 
perceived collective efficacy and team effectiveness. Their study contributes to the accounting 
literature that focuses on work teams, as well as the role of team-level motivation and how it 
differs from individual-level motivation.     
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regulatory process and procedures.  This paper is the first to evaluate the performance of the 
Board, including the development and passage of financial accounting standards, rather than 
assessing the impact of finalized standards.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews related literature and 
outlines the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection process. Section 4 
outlines the research design, including factor analysis and multivariate regressions.  Section 5 
discusses the main findings and robustness tests.  Section 6 concludes.  
  
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Efficiency in Regulation 
The merits of efficiency in regulation can be observed in the work of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the independent agency providing audit, evaluation, and 
investigation services to the U.S Congress13.  The GAO works to “…support congressional 
oversight by auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are being spent 
efficiently and effectively; investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities; [and] 
reporting on how well government programs and policies are meeting their objectives…” (GAO, 
2015).  After completing an audit, the GAO makes recommendations aimed at improving the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of an agency’s operations (GAO, 2004).  This oversight 
produces measurable financial benefits to the federal government14, resulting from 
recommendations that save resources, increase revenues, improve accountability, operations and 
services, and increase the effectiveness of federal spending.        
                                                
13 The GAO originally performed financial audits examining the economy and efficiency of 
government operations after World War II, and has since become an independent part of the 
legislative branch of the U.S. government.   
14 The GAO most recently reported a financial benefit of over $54 billion for fiscal year 2012 
(GAO, 2015). 
11 
 
It’s clear that efficiency in government regulation is valued by the GAO, Congress and 
U.S. taxpayers.  Along this same line, efficiency in accounting regulation should be valued by 
the FASB, the SEC, and the Board’s constituents.  As the GAO strives to improve efficiency for 
the benefit of taxpayers, the FASB should strive to improve its efficiency for the benefit of its 
constituents.   
Efficiency in accounting regulation is not a new concept.  In fact, when the FASB began 
operations in 1973, the AICPA Wheat Committee suggested that, “The seven-man Standards 
Board we are recommending seems to us to be small enough to be efficient and large enough to 
provide for a variety of views and backgrounds” (1972).  It appears that in more recent years, the 
FASB has become more mindful of the importance of efficiency, or at least the perception of 
efficiency.  In 2007, the FAF established the Trustees’ Special Committee on Governance 
Review, which was tasked with examining the structure, effectiveness, and efficiency of the 
governance process of the FAF, FASB and GASB (FAF Press Release, 2008).  And, as 
previously mentioned, Chairman Golden has emphasized improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Board’s operations as one of the FASB’s top priorities for the future. 
 
2.2 Dependent Variable: Efficiency Measures  
There are no obvious or widely accepted empirical metrics in the accounting literature 
that capture “efficiency,” therefore I develop a new measure sourced from operational 
management literature.  To create this efficiency metric I adapt a six-item scale based on 
measurements of team effectiveness and work force management practices, from Kathuria and 
Davis (2001) and Chong and Mahama (2013), and apply it to the FASB framework.   
The six items incorporated in the scale include:   
12 
 
1. accuracy of work performed 
2. quantity of work performed 
3. quality of work performed 
4. operating efficiency 
5. client satisfaction 
6. timeliness in meeting delivery schedule. 
 
Using this scale as a guide, I identify a large set of variables that encompass different 
characteristics of efficiency and collapse those variables into three underlying “efficiency 
factors”. 
I elaborate on each of these six-scale items and collect observable, archival data on the standard-
level, in order to estimate the efficiency of the FASB during my sample period as follows.   
 
Accuracy of work performed – Final versions of standards produced by the FASB should be 
clear, concise and prepared in accordance with GAAP.  Subsequent revision of a standard, as 
well as the provision of additional interpretive materials may be an indication that a standard was 
unclear or unusable by the financial community (Pasewark, 2000).  Data collected to capture 
accuracy includes the number of paragraphs in a standard superseded by subsequent 
pronouncements and the number of Other Interpretive Pronouncements issued by the FASB to 
clarify or explain an existing standard.  
 
Quantity of work performed – The amount of FASB output is an important component of 
efficiency.  The Board issues numerous types of official FASB Documents, including Statement 
13 
 
of Financial Accounting Standards, Exposure Drafts, Discussion Papers, Interpretations, 
Invitations to Comment, Special Reports, Research Projects, etc.  Data collected to capture the 
quantity of work performed includes the total number of documents issued by the Board each 
year.   
 
Quality of work performed – Standard quality is measured as a function of length, complexity, 
amount of detail, and level of consensus among Board members.  Longer, more detailed 
standards with a greater number of examples may be indicative of higher quality.  The degree of 
conflict among Board members during the voting process, as well as whether or not a standard is 
passed with a unanimous vote may be another indication of standard quality.  Data collected to 
capture the quality of work performed includes the word count for the body of each standard, the 
number of paragraphs, the number of examples provided in a standard appendix, the word count 
of the appendix, the percentage of dissenting votes for each standard, and whether or not the 
standard was passed by a unanimous vote..  
 
Operating efficiency – The FASB has a responsibility to deliver its services to the financial 
reporting community in the most cost effective manner possible while still ensuring high quality 
standards.  Decreasing outputs may be an indication that the Board is misallocating time, money, 
people, or other resources.  Data collected to capture operating efficiency includes the percentage 
of items completed on the FASB Agenda each year.              
 
Client satisfaction – The Board has constituents in place of clients, but their participation and 
satisfaction is an important consideration in determining the final versions of accounting 
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standards.  A greater number of comment letters and/or hearing participation may indicate a 
lower level of satisfaction among constituents.  Data collected to capture the client (constituent) 
satisfaction includes the number of comment letters written by constituents for a standard, 
whether or not a public hearing was included in the due process, and the number of academic 
papers published in any of the top accounting journals about a standard.          
 
Timeliness – Globalization, technological change, financial innovation and regulatory 
competition have increased the pace of change in the financial reporting system.  While it has 
always been necessary for the FASB to respond to emerging issues in financial reporting, the 
ability to balance both timeliness and quality is more important than ever (SEC, 2003b).  I 
identify two distinct time periods during the standard setting process, the “hatching period”, 
spanning from the year an item is added to the FASB Agenda to the year an Exposure Draft is 
issued, and the “finalization period”, beginning the year an Exposure Draft is issued and ending 
in the year a standard is issued.  Data collected to capture timeliness includes the number of days 
in the hatching period, the number of days in the finalization period, and the total number of days 
from the placement of an issue on the FASB Agenda to the final standard issuance.  
 
In total, 16 data points are collected for each standard.  For a more detailed breakdown 
the six-item scale, including the variables collected and data gathering process, see Appendix A.   
 
2.3 Hypotheses  
There is a dearth of empirical evidence on the FASB standard setting process, particularly 
relating to output, productivity, or any measure of efficiency.  As the economy has changed 
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through technology and innovation, so has the need for an accounting framework that can 
quickly accommodate these changes.  According to former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford, 
“With the increasing speed of change in our business world, I believe the Board must become 
more serious about its recently adopted strategic direction to set standards in a more efficient and 
timely way” (1997).  My primary objective is to identify the effects of different organizational 
changes on FASB efficiency in the accounting regulatory process, including funding, voting, and 
Board member characteristics.      
 
2.3.1 Change in Financial Accounting Standards Board Funding 
In 2002, SOX altered the source of FASB funding from voluntary contributions to 
mandatory accounting support fees collected from all publicly traded companies.  The impact of 
this funding change on FASB efficiency is unknown.   
 On one hand, the availability of public funding may increase the efficiency of the FASB.  
Guaranteed financial support frees the FASB from any fundraising obligations or concerns about 
the continued operation of the Board.  In this way, it potentially affords Board members more 
time for debating and developing standards.  The funding change also allows the FASB to 
increase its annual budget, and in particular, its Board member and employee salaries.  This 
readily accessible cash allows the FASB to remain competitive in attracting and retaining 
individuals with appropriate technical expertise, which may positively impact standard setting 
efficiency.   
 Additionally, the switch to public funding helps reassure the Board remains independent 
from all constituent groups15 and avoids regulatory capture.  It is possible that the former funding 
                                                
15 The FASB has long been aware of potential independence issues arising from the voluntary 
contribution funding system, in appearance if not in fact.  In 1977, the FAF recommended and 
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arrangement encouraged the FASB to provide special consideration in the standard setting 
process to important financial contributors.  The threat of withdrawal of funds from dissatisfied 
contributors may have impaired the Board’s ability to pass unpopular or controversial standards.  
The FASB may work more efficiently when it is not faced with the threat of losing constituent 
support and contributions.   
 This notion is supported by the discussion and implementation of funding for the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  At its inception, the IASB was financed 
through voluntary contributions by over 200 organizations, but similar independence concerns 
(lack of objectivity, potential to lose funding and disrupt work) were raised by observers.  The 
IASB ultimately decided that, “While neither of these concerns materialized in practice, there 
was a sense that dependence on voluntary contributions from largely private sources was 
inappropriate for an organization acting in the public interest…” (IFRS Foundation, 2011).  
Ultimately, the IASB’s funding structure is comparable to the FASB’s on an international scale: 
the majority of funding is based on national financing regimes relative to a country’s GDP, with 
some income from publications and contributions (IFRS, 2015).      
 On the other hand, it is possible to observe the opposite effect – that the mandatory public 
fee structure negatively impacts the efficiency of the FASB.  The continued survival of the Board 
is no longer dependent on contributions or publication revenue, therefore the levels of output and 
overall productivity may decrease.  The accounting support fees are essentially guaranteed, so 
the Board may be less motivated to add items to, or complete items on, the Technical Agenda.  
While the funding change safeguards Board independence from constituents, it raises new 
concerns of independence from the government.  Empirical literature in political science has 
                                                                                                                                                       
adopted a resolution limiting contributions from any single firm in any single year to $50,000 in 
order to, “…maintain the credibility of the FASB and also to provide a sense of assurance for the 
Board and staff” as well as broaden the base of support for the Board (U.S. GAO, 1996).     
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shown that Democratic regulators are unsympathetic to regulations that favor corporate interests 
(Cohen, 1986; Dal Bo, 2006), and Allen and Ramanna (2013) show that Democratic FASB and 
SEC regulators tend to be more sympathetic to standards that mitigate corporations’ information 
advantage over outsiders through increased “reliability” and decreased “relevance”.  Since the 
FASB is subject to oversight by the SEC and Congress, the government could potentially 
influence the accounting regulatory process.  
 Since the funding change has the potential to positively or negatively influence the 
efficiency of the FASB, I present my hypothesis in the null: 
 
H1: The FASB funding change from voluntary contributions to mandatory accounting 
support fees does not affect the efficiency of the Board in the accounting standard setting 
process.   
 
2.3.2 Change in Financial Accounting Standards Board Voting Requirements 
The FASB has simultaneously been accused by the business community of being too 
active and passing standards that were not generally accepted, and accused by Congress of not 
being active enough and being “captured” by the business community (Kirk, 1990).  In 1976, the 
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management concluded that, “AICPA control over 
the FASB is carefully written into the charter and bylaws creating the FASB” and that “A 
‘revolving door’ arrangement between the FASB and the big accounting firms supporting it has 
apparently already begun”.  Around the same time, the AICPA established the Special 
Committee on Accounting Standards Overload, to, “Study accounting standards overload and to 
consider alternative means of providing relief from accounting standards which are found not be 
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cost effective…” (AICPA, 1983).  This committee found that accounting standards overload is a 
real and pressing problem, caused by a number of factors, including: too many standards, 
standards that are too detailed, the inability to be selective in the application of standards, 
requirements for excessive disclosures, etc.  These and several other criticisms have led to 
numerous debates in the accounting community on the advantages of different voting 
requirements (super versus simple majority) on standard generation, which has led to changes of 
the voting requirements of the Board.  In response to these changes, there has been some 
research using simulations to examine how these different voting structures affect the outcome of 
FASB decisions, but overall results have been mixed16.   
On one hand, it is possible that the FASB is more efficient in setting accounting standards 
when a simple majority vote is required.  Pasewark (2000) studies the effect of voting 
requirements on the time taken to generate standards and the subsequent revision of these 
standards and finds that super majority voting delays the process.  He finds a decrease in the 
frequency of standards issued and an increase in the amount of time taken to generate standards 
when the super majority vote is required.  A simple majority requires only four affirmative votes, 
potentially decreasing the amount of time the Board members spend debating issues/standards, 
and reducing the chance of an impasse.  Additionally, other similar regulatory organizations like 
the PCAOB and the SEC require only a simple majority vote.   
In 1977, when discussing the merits of the switch to simple majority voting, the FAF 
stated before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that, “The new requirement of a 
simple majority can speed the work of the Board without affecting the quality of its 
                                                
16 King (1994) investigates how simple and super majority voting affect committee decisions and 
finds mixed support; Fields and King (1996) find that simulations support the prediction that 
supermajority voting maintains the status quo more often than simple majority, but that super 
majority voting reduces the utility of committee members.   
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pronouncements”.  25 years later when the voting requirement was again changed from super to 
simple majority, the FAF echoed these earlier sentiments, claiming, “…the Trustees determined 
that a change from a 5-to-2 to a 4-to-3 member voting requirement would make for a more 
efficient process without compromising the quality of the FASB’s standard setting process” 
(FASB News Release, 2002).  The simple majority requirement potentially decreases the 
FASB’s response time in identifying, discussing and resolving pressing financial accounting 
issues or requests, thereby increasing its efficiency.   
Alternatively, it is also possible that the FASB is less efficient in setting accounting 
standards when a simple majority vote is required.  Supporters of the super majority17 claim that 
a five-to-two vote is necessary to induce constituent approval and to reduce the perception that 
certain standards fail to achieve a high enough level of acceptance/support to constitute a 
“generally accepted” principal (FAF, 2007).  As former Chairman Donald Kirk explains, “If, 
after extensive deliberations and debate, five of the ‘unquestionably high quality… members of 
the FASB’ cannot agree, no standard is ‘not such a bad thing’” (1990).  If standards are not 
accepted by constituents, there is an increased likelihood that  reporting entities will seek out 
loopholes or fail to apply the existing standards with the intent with which they are written, 
perpetuating the need for new standards or more updates.  
It’s also argued that the amount of time required to attain the fifth vote is negligible, and 
will therefore not have much of an effect on the FASB’s due process.  At most, obtaining the 
extra vote only adds a few extra months onto a process that already takes years to complete 
(Kirk, 1990).  Lower quality standards may result from the simple majority requirement, since 
                                                
17 In response to the FAF’s 1989 request for comment on the super/simple voting issue, 
approximately sixty percent of commentators supported that change from simple to super 
majority voting, including five of the “big six” accounting firms.  When the supermajority was 
reinstated in 1990, the majority of the FAF supported the change, voting 11-5 (Kirk 1990).       
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less vigorous intellectual debate is required to convince four Board members rather than five.  
These low quality standards are more likely to be amended, superseded, or require detailed 
interpretations or subsequent pronouncements, thereby reducing future time commitments of the 
Board and decreasing FASB efficiency in the long term.   
Since the simple majority voting requirement has the potential to positively or negatively 
impact the FASB’s efficiency in accounting standard setting, I make no directional prediction:  
 
H2: The FASB voting change from simple majority to super majority does not affect the 
efficiency of the Board in the accounting standard setting process.   
 
2.3.3 Change in Financial Accounting Standards Board Members’ Characteristics 
The Board member characteristics I utilize in this study include professional background 
and political affiliation.  Ex-ante, it is unknown if these individual characteristics positively or 
negatively impact the efficiency of the FASB in the standard setting process.   
The FASB is organized as a committee where each member has a single vote and the 
Chairman of the Board has no veto power.  The due process is lengthy and includes many 
feedback opportunities for constituents, who are invited to write comment letters, participate in 
roundtable discussions, attend public hearings, etc.  For very high profile cases, constituents have 
been known to rally Congress, the SEC, and the media (Zeff, 2002).  It’s possible these external 
forces have a larger impact on FASB efficiency than any individual member contribution, which 
would reinforce the belief that individual Board members don’t significantly influence the 
accounting regulatory process.       
However, there is some evidence that suggests Board member characteristics do 
influence the standard setting process.  Prior regulation literature has found that regulators’ 
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preferences can influence regulatory outcomes.  Gormley (1979) studies the voting choices of 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and finds evidence that the appointment of a 
former member of a regulated industry to a regulatory agency increases the likelihood of 
favorable decisions towards that industry.  He also finds evidence that former broadcasters are 
more committed to their former industry than philosophical constancy, consistent with the 
notions of capture theory18,19.  Additionally, he finds that political party differences are more 
important than differences based on prior employment.   
Allen and Ramanna (2013) study how the professional and political characteristics of 
regulators vary in the nature of Exposure Drafts proposed over the life of the FASB, and 
document as association between FASB members’ collective backgrounds and the trade-off 
between “reliability” and “relevance” in proposed accounting standards.  Jiang et al. (2014b) 
measure a single Board member’s impact on the final passage of a standard, and find that even 
with joint decision making, individual policymakers make a difference.     
Jiang et al. (2014a) investigate the influence of Board members’ professional 
backgrounds, personality traits, and career concerns on their voting decisions and find there are 
certain individual characteristics that are more or less likely to dissent during the voting process.  
They observe that when certain member characteristics held differing minority views, they were 
                                                
18 Gormley (1979) finds that former broadcasters were more likely to change their opinions and 
votes on regulation, depending on whether or not regulation would help or hinder broadcasters.  
Former broadcasters voted to deregulate broadcasting as long as cable was also deregulated, but 
voted against deregulation when the interests of the broadcasting and cable industries conflicted.        
19 Capture theory assumes that regulators are economic agents who seek to maximize their own 
utility, usually through a mixture of money and power.  The constituents in the industry being 
regulated “capture” the regulator, who then makes decisions based on these constituents’ best 
interests instead of decisions that are socially efficiency (Stigler [1971], Peltzman [1976]).      
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less likely to be resolved through compromise and negotiation during Board deliberations and 
more likely to dissent, consistent with the ideology theory of regulation20.            
Anecdotally, former Chairman Dennis Beresford lends support to the idea that members’ 
professional backgrounds influence the standard setting process.  He states that, “In general, the 
issuers [of financial reports] want few standards, or only very broad standards, with plenty of 
room for the exercise of judgment in their application; auditors are inclined to want more 
standards, and more specific ones, that will defuse differences of opinion with clients; and users 
want a maximum of reliable, relevant information” (Van Riper and Ebrary, 1994).  The presence 
or absence of these professional backgrounds, or varying combinations of professional 
backgrounds co-existing on the Board may impact the efficiency of the FASB during standard 
setting.   
Whether or not Board member professional or political background affects the efficiency 
of the FASB during the accounting standard setting process is unknown, therefore I again present 
my hypothesis in the null form:     
 
H3: FASB members’ professional and political characteristics do not affect the efficiency of 
the Board in the accounting standard setting process.   
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1 Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 
The observations in this study are based on the standard-level, specifically, the pre-
codification FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS).  My sample contains 
                                                
20 Ideology theory assumes that regulators are exogenously endowed with “ideologies” or beliefs 
that motivate their decisions and regulatory outcomes are the joint result of these ideologies and 
constituent lobbying (Kau and Rubin [1979], Kalt and Zupan [1984]).  
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166 standards issued by the FASB from 1973 – 2008, including SFAS 1-163, plus SFAS 123R, 
132R, and 141R, which are revised versions of earlier standards.  In 2009, the FASB launched 
the Accounting Standards Codification, which reorganized previously issued GAAP 
pronouncements into approximately 90 accounting topics using a new, updated structure.  Before 
the Codification, SFASs were considered to be the most authoritative source of GAAP; however 
after 2009 new pronouncements issued by the Board are called Accounting Standards Updates 
(ASUs) and directly change the FASB Codification.  In order to maintain consistency, my 
sample ends in 2008, the final year before the Codification.  All of the superseded accounting 
pronouncements, abstracts, interpretations, and other FASB documents associated with former 
standards are available in the FASB Reference Library, provided on the FASB website21.     
 
3.2 Financial Accounting Standards Board Changes 
My first two tests of FASB efficiency in accounting standard setting focus on the funding 
structure and voting rules of the Board.  Data on FASB funding and voting is primarily collected 
from the Financial Accounting Foundation Annual Reports from 1973 – 2008.  Each year, the 
FAF issues an Annual Report that includes detailed information on the FASB, Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC), Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB), and the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council (GASAC).  
Content in this report includes complete lists of and short biographies for each FASB member, 
records of all documents issued by the Board in a given year, and detailed financial information, 
including Management’s Discussion and Analysis of the Results of Operations and Financial 
Condition, Statements of Activities, Statements of Cash Flows, Notes to the Financial 
Statements, and the Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firms.  There is also a 
                                                
21 www.fasb.org. 
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section of the Annual Report written by the Chairman of the FASB, which typically addresses 
issues such as Board performance, short and long term goals, any updates to FASB’s due process 
or mission, etc. 
Additional information, such as the proposals for and debate surrounding the funding and 
voting changes, is collected from various press releases, including FAF News Releases and 
FASB News Releases, FAF Requests for Comment, responses to the FAF Requests for 
Comment, and the FASB’s  “Status Report”22. 
 
3.3 Financial Accounting Standards Board Member Characteristics 
In order to test for a relation between Board member characteristics and standard setting 
efficiency, I draw on previous empirical studies and include the professional and political 
backgrounds of FASB members (Allen and Ramanna, 2013, Jiang et al. 2014a).  I classify FASB 
members’ professional backgrounds into one of two groups: accountant or non-accountant.  The 
first group, “accountant” includes members with public accounting and preparer backgrounds, 
and the second group, “non-accountant” includes members with financial statement user, 
regulator, or academic backgrounds.  Each of these groups has a different set of incentives and 
priorities for accounting standards and regulation.  I classify each FASB member as accountant 
or non-accountant based upon his/her most recent (pre-FASB) employment.  For example, 
Donald J. Kirk was a partner at Price Waterhouse & Co. before joining the FASB; therefore he 
would be categorized as an accountant.  Robert T. Sprouse was a professor of accounting at 
Stanford University before joining the Board; therefore he would be categorized as a non-
                                                
22 The “Status Report” was re-named the “FASB Report” in 2002. 
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accountant23.  The most recent employment information for each Board member is obtained from 
the FAF Annual Reports, and additional details can be found in FASB News Releases 
announcing their appointments and/or re-elections to the Board.   
I assemble information on FASB members’ political affiliations following the 
methodology of Allen and Ramanna (2013).  Members of the FASB are appointed by the non-
governmental FAF, and therefore are not political appointees, so the political identity of 
members’ is not directly observable.  However, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects 
and archives the data on all campaign contributions made by U.S. individuals in excess of $200.  
Therefore, political affiliation can be inferred by examining the history of FASB members’ 
campaign donations.  Members who have contributed to the Democratic Party are classified as 
Democrats, and those that have contributed to the Republican Party are classified as 
Republicans.  Members who have not contributed to either party remain unclassified.       
 
3.4 Control Variables       
In order to control for other Board member characteristics outside of the professional and 
political realm, I collect data on the duration of FASB member service, term limits and term-
ends for each member.  This data is obtained primarily from the FAF Annual Reports, which lists 
current Board members each year and includes their term expiration dates.  Information relating 
to member re-elections or departures is also included in these reports.  Additional details about 
Board member elections, retirements, departures, etc., are occasionally disclosed in FASB News 
Releases or FAF News Releases.  
                                                
23 It is important to stress that the accountant/non-accountant classification is based solely on 
members’ most recent former employer.  There are likely regulators or members of academia 
that are CPAs or who have worked in public accounting in the past but have not been practicing 
in more recent years.  The assumption here is that the incentives/priorities of a FASB member 
will be more closely aligned with the group they have been most recently identifying with. 
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To control for some of the external political influences on the FASB, I include data on 
the political affiliation of SEC commissioners, the President, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.  The party affiliation of SEC Commissioners is declared prior to their 
appointments, so this information is collected from the SEC’s historical archives.  I combine the 
political affiliation of the President, Senate, and House of Representatives into a single political 
affiliation index in order to capture the strength of Democratic Party influence on the FASB.  
The index has a maximum value of 3 if all are affiliated with the Democratic Party (i.e. 
Democratic president and a Democratic majority in both the House and Senate) and 0 if none are 
affiliated with the Democratic Party.   
 
4. Research Design 
To analyze the efficiency of the FASB, I follow a two-stage approach.  First, I employ 
exploratory factor analysis24 to identify the key underlying efficiency constructs that summarize 
the original set of observed variables based on Kathuria and Davis (2001) and Chong and 
Mahama (2013).  Second, a regression analysis is performed on the retained efficiency factors.  
 
4.1 Factor Analysis 
                                                
24 There are two types of factor analysis, exploratory and confirmatory: 
Exploratory factor analysis – used when there are no a priori constraints on the estimation of 
components or the number of components to be extracted.  Exploratory factor analysis is usually 
performed in the early stages of research as a tool for consolidating variables (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). 
Confirmatory factor analysis – used when a researcher has preconceived thoughts on the actual 
structure of the data, based on theoretical support or prior research.  The researcher will assess 
the degree to which the data meet the expected structure (Hair et al. 1998).  
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In order to extract meaningful information from the efficiency data, I utilize exploratory 
factor analysis25.  Factor analysis is a multivariate technique useful in summarization and data 
reduction, which can derive the underlying dimensions that describe data into a much smaller 
number of concepts than the original variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  Through factor 
analysis, I am able to retain the nature and character of the original variables in the dataset, but 
reduce their number to simplify the subsequent multivariate analysis.  I anticipate the efficiency 
of the FASB may vary with respect to the phase of standard generation taking place (the hatching 
period versus the finalization period), therefore, I analyze each period separately.     
Summary statistics for each of the 16 variables collected in the hatching and finalization 
period are presented in Table 1 Panels A and B.  Data descriptions and the collection process are 
detailed in Appendix A.  Observations are made on the standard-level, so many of the values in 
the hatching and finalization period do not change (for example, the number of paragraphs 
contained in a standard does not change between the two periods), but those variables that differ 
                                                
25 Factor analysis is a method of data reduction that seeks underlying unobservable (latent) 
variables that are reflected in the observed variables.  Factor analysis is similar to another 
multivariate procedure, Principal Component Analysis.  Although both procedures analyze 
correlation matrices, there are major differences in the analysis and interpretation of the variance 
in the data.  The two methods are used for different reasons, are not mechanically the same, and 
have different underlying linear models. 
Factor Analysis – assumes that observed variables are linear combinations of some underlying 
(hypothetical or unobservable) factors.  In FA, only the shared variance is analyzed.  Factors are 
interpreted as the underlying (latent) variables that cause the covariation between the observed 
variables (Kim and Mueller 1978a).   
Principal Components Analysis – all variance of the observed variables (shared, unique and 
error variance) is analyzed.  The components are interpreted as empirically determined 
aggregates of the variables without any presumed theory (Joliffe, 2002).  
Since the purpose of my procedure is to condense the information contained in my original 
variables into a smaller set of (unobserved) dimensions with minimal information loss, I utilize 
FA.    
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(for example, the total number of documents issued in the year of the Exposure Draft versus the 
year the final standard is issued) are significantly different.  This supports the idea that the 
efficiency of the FASB varies between the two periods.  Correlation matrices are included in 
Panels C and D, and show that observations in both periods display relatively strong 
associations.  This pattern of correlation suggests some of these variables may capture the same 
underlying constructs and can potentially be consolidated into new variables, supporting the use 
of factor analysis26.       
The initial, unrotated factor solution from the factor analysis is included in Appendix B.  
In determining how many factors to extract, I rely on the Kaiser test and the Scree test27, which 
provide guidelines on balancing the tradeoff between simplicity (by retaining as few factors as 
possible) and completeness (explaining as much of the variation in the data as possible).  Both 
tests support extracting three factors which together explain about 90% of the total variance of 
the original dataset.  The first factor (Factor1) can be viewed as the single best summary of linear 
relationships exhibited in the data.  The second factor (Factor2) is the second-best linear 
combination of the variables, subject to the constraint that it is orthogonal to the first factor.  The 
third factor (Factor3) is the third-best linear combination of the variables, subject to the 
constraint that it is orthogonal to the first two factors, and so forth (Hair et al. 1998).      
                                                
26 There are a substantial number of correlations greater than 0.3, supporting the application of 
factor analysis.  A second measure used to quantify the degree of intercorrelations among the 
variables and the appropriateness of factor analysis is the measure of sample adequacy, MSA 
(this is also referred to as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin, or KMO index).  The KMO index for the 
hatching and finalization period is 0.74, and 0.75, respectively, both of which qualify as 
“middling”, meaning it is sufficient for factor analysis (Hair et al. 1998). 
27 According to the Kaiser test, only factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater are meaningful 
and should be retained.  The Scree test uses graphical criteria to determine which factors to keep 
(Joliffe, 2002). 
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This unrotated factor solution achieves the objective of data reduction, but is not easily 
interpretable for the variables under consideration.  In order to simplify the interpretation of 
these factors, I apply an orthogonal Varimax rotation to the initial factor solution28.  After the 
rotation, I am able to identify three underlying efficiency constructs, present in both the hatching 
and finalization period: Factor1, Factor2, and Factor3.  The results of the rotated solution are 
presented in Table 2 Panels A and B.  These factors are intended to capture the efficiency of the 
FASB during the accounting standard setting process.   
From here, I am able to more easily interpret and name the three factors retained from the 
analysis.  The higher a factor loads, the more relevant the factor is in defining the factor’s 
dimensionality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  Results for the hatching and finalization period 
are very similar.  The variables contributing to each factor are identical in both periods, the order 
(by size of factor loadings) in which the variables contribute to the factors are also the same, and 
all of the factor loadings are quantitatively similar.     
Factor 1 loads most significantly on the number of paragraphs included in a standard, the 
standard word count, the number of paragraphs in a standard superseded by subsequent 
pronouncements, whether or not a public hearing was held during the due process for a standard, 
the number of academic papers published involving a standard, the number of comment letters 
received for a standard, and the standard appendix word count.  This factor captures the overall 
thoroughness of a particular standard, as measured by the attention to detail, length, and 
meticulosity of the FASB while drafting the standard.  I will refer to Factor 1 as “Thoroughness”.   
                                                
28 Rotation is used after extraction to maximize high correlations between factors and variables 
and minimize low ones.  I utilize the VARIMAX rotation.  It is important to note that no method 
of rotation will improve the degree of fit between the data and the factor structure – the different 
rotation methods only aids in interpretation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).    
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The second factor loads most significantly on the number of days from the addition of an 
item on the Agenda to the standard issuance, the number of days from Agenda to Exposure Draft 
issuance, and the number of days from the Exposure Draft to the final standard issuance.  This 
factor reveals the importance of time management for the FASB in the standard setting process; 
therefore I will refer to it as “Timeliness”.   
The third factor loads significantly on the percentage of dissenting votes for a standard, 
and whether or not a standard is passed unanimously.  This factor captures the underlying level 
of agreement among Board members (ideological, professional, political, or other) during the 
standard setting process.  I will refer to Factor 3 as “Consensus”.  These three efficiency factors 
are used as dependent variables in the subsequent multivariate analysis.  
 
4.2 Multivariate Model 
I assess how my measures of FASB efficiency vary with the changes made to the FASB’s 
funding and voting structures, as well as changes in Board member characteristics.  
Consequently, the dependent variables in my regressions are the efficiency constructs identified 
in the previous section by factor analysis: Thoroughness, Timeliness, and Consensus.   
I test for an association between the dependent variable (efficiency) and FASB changes 
in funding, voting, and Board members’ professional and political backgrounds.  The formal 
specification for these regressions is given by: 
 
Factor Ni,t = f (IssuerAccSuppFeest, SimpleMjrtyt, Accountantt, RepMembert,          (1) 
Tenuret, PctReElectt, PctTermEndt, PctDemSECt, DemInflncet)  
 
Where: 
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Factor Ni,t is one of the three efficiency factors identified by factor analysis, Thoroughness, 
Timeliness or Conesensus, measuring FASB efficiency for the passage of standard i in year t. 
IssuerAccSuppFeest is the total dollar amount of mandatory accounting support fees paid to the 
FASB by issuers of securities, expressed as a percentage of total operating revenue. 
SimpleMjrtyt is an indicator variable equal to one if a standard was passed in a year with a simple 
majority voting requirement and zero otherwise.   
Accountantt is a measure of the proportion of Board members with most recent former employ as 
public accountants or preparers.   
RepMembert is a measure of the proportion of Board members making campaign contributions to 
the Republican Party.   
Tenuret is a measure of the average tenure in years of extant Board members.  
PctReElectt is a measure of the proportion of Board members who are up for re-election. 
PctTermEndt is a measure of the proportion of Board members who are in their terminal year of 
service.  PctDemSECt is the proportion of SEC Commissioners affiliated with the Democratic 
Party. 
DemInflncet is an index that measures the level of Democratic influence on the Board from the 
Senate, House of Representatives, and President.   
 
All Board mechanisms and member characteristics are computed at the standard-level for 
the hatching and finalization periods.  Coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS).   
 
5. Empirical Analysis  
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5.1 Statements of Financial Accounting Standards Summary Statistics 
See Appendix C for a summary definition of all the variables used in the study.  Table 3 
presents more detail on the 166 standards passed by the FASB from 1973-2008.  Panel A shows 
that on average, the hatching period (Agenda date to Exposure Draft date) lasts 879 days.  The 
finalization period (Exposure Draft date to issuance) lasts about 257 days.  Panel C presents the 
frequency distribution of the initiation and completion of the standards.  The largest number of 
standards issued in a single year is 18, occurring in 1982, and the lowest number of standards 
issued in a single year is 1, occurring in both 2005 and 1973.  To give some idea of the content 
of each SFAS, Panel D uses standard theme classifications from Wallace (2001) and presents the 
number of standards in each theme category.  The most common standard themes include: 
specialized practices/industry guidance, debt and securitizations, pensions and other 
compensation, marketable securities, derivatives and hedging, and leases. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on explanatory and control variables for the hatching and 
finalization periods are included in Table 4.  The dependent variables retained from factor 
analysis, Thoroughness, Timeliness and Consensus, are standardized and do not differ 
significantly between each period.  The mean value of the mandatory accounting support fees 
paid to the FASB by issuers of securities, IssuerAccSuppFees, is significantly larger in the 
finalization period, which is expected since the payment of these fees was not mandated until 
2003, and this period covers a larger portion of the later years in the sample.  The hatching 
period spans from the time an item is added to the FASB Agenda, beginning in 1973 to the time 
33 
 
an Exposure Draft is issued, so any Exposure Drafts created before 2003 will have a zero balance 
for this measure.        
For FASB voting, one can see the mean for SimpleMjrty is higher in the finalization 
period than the hatching period, which suggests that more standards were finalized and issued 
when the simple majority vote was in place.  Table 4 also illustrates that some standards added to 
the FASB Agenda during a super majority voting year were finalized and issued during a simple 
majority voting year.    
When examining the professional and political backgrounds of Board members, I find 
that the mean proportion of Board members with public accounting/preparer backgrounds, 
Accountant, is significantly higher in the hatching period than in the finalization period.  This 
suggests that a higher percentage of accountants are involved in the formation/creation of 
standards than in the finalization/passage of standards.  I also find that the tenure of Board 
members, Tenure, and the percent of Board members up for re-election, PctReElect, are higher, 
on average, during the finalization period.  It appears that more experienced Board members or 
members that are up for re-election are more likely to be involved in the finalization of a 
standard, possibly because they are more likely to compromise.  
Another significant difference detected between the two periods is the external political 
influence of the Democratic Party on the FASB, DemInflnce, which is significantly larger in the 
hatching period.  A potential explanation for this observation is that a Democratic majority 
Senate or House of Representatives is more likely to assert influence on the FASB Agenda, or 
the decision of the Board to address an accounting issue (hatching period) than on the specific 
details of a standard (finalization period).  Another possible explanation is that the Democratic 
Party is more likely to attempt to influence the content or ideology of a standard than the 
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Republican Party.  Overall, these results suggest that some FASB characteristics and member 
characteristics do vary between the hatching and finalization periods.   
Table 4 Panels C and D report the Pearson correlations among the variables of interest.  
Consistent with prior research, there are some moderate correlations between FASB members’ 
professional and political characteristics.  This is observed in both the hatching period and 
finalization period.    
 
 
5.3 Main Analysis 
Table 5 reports OLS estimation results where each of the three efficiency factors, 
Thoroughness, Timeliness and Consensus, serves as the dependent variable.  For ease of 
exposition, I flip the signs for Timeliness and Consensus so that a higher number means more 
timeliness/consensus.  Panel A presents results for the hatching period, and Panel B presents 
results for the finalization period.   
For the hatching period, when testing for an association between the FASB efficiency and 
the change in funding, I find no significant results for Thoroughness, Timeliness or Consensus.  
The results are positively signed for Thoroughness and Consensus and negatively signed for 
Timeliness, but statistically insignificant.  These results are inconsistent with the argument that 
under the previous funding structure, Board members wasted substantial amounts of time and/or 
money with fundraising activities and other engagements designed to increase the FASB’s 
exposure in order to ensure continued contributions.  However, the results are also inconsistent 
with the opposing viewpoint that guaranteed funding for the Board would reduce 
motivation/output/productivity and slow down the standard setting process.  It is possible that 
both of these influences are observed in the data and the results offset each other, translating to 
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no significant, observable affect.  Overall, it appears that while the change from voluntary 
contributions to mandatory accounting support fees may have bolstered FASB independence, it 
did not have a significant impact of the efficiency of the Board in the standard setting process. 
When testing for an association between FASB efficiency and the change in voting, I find 
a significant, negative relation between the simple majority vote and Thoroughness.  This is 
consistent with the prediction that lowering the number of votes necessary to pass a standard 
may lead to inferior standards, and that the simple majority vote may allow lower quality votes 
to “squeak through” by a single vote.  Interesting, I find no significant relation between the 
simple majority vote and Timeliness, which contradicts the commonly held argument that 
requiring fewer votes to pass a standard speeds up the accounting regulatory process.  I also find 
a significant, negative relation between the simple majority vote and Consensus, confirming that 
the overall level of agreement among Board members is reduced when the number of votes 
required to pass a standard is reduced.          
When professional characteristics are examined, I find a significant, negative association 
between Accountant and Thoroughness.  This suggests that FASB members with public 
accounting or preparer backgrounds may be less concerned with providing specific, detailed 
guidance in standards and more interested in providing conceptual rules or guidelines.  It’s also 
possible that Board members with accounting backgrounds exhibit a preference for accounting 
changes, particularly since the production of new standards can increase the demand for audit 
services and professional expertise, which is consistent with Accountants wanting to push new 
standards through as quickly as possible, at the determent of Thoroughness.  This tradeoff 
between Thoroughness and Timeliness is supported by the significant, positive coefficient 
observed for Accountant and Timeliness. 
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I find a significant, negative relation between the percentage of Republican members on 
the Board, RepMember, and Thoroughness, which is congruous with the more hands-off, limited 
government ideals of the Republican Party.  These members appear to support shorter, more 
limited standards with less specific guidance and examples.  I also observe a significant, positive 
relation between RepMember and Consensus, which suggests these Republican ideals tend to be 
in the majority among Board members.       
Another significant characteristic is Board member tenure, which is negatively associated 
with Thoroughness.  This result suggests that Board members with more experience may be less 
concerned with specifics and details of standards, such as the standard length or number of 
examples included.  I also find a positive association between the proportion of Board members 
in their final year of service, PctTermEnd, and Thoroughness, as well as a negative association 
between PctTermEnd and Consensus.  It’s possible that Board members in their final years 
attempt to be more accommodating of constituent viewpoints (increasing Thoroughness) or that 
they separate themselves from any unpopular or controversial standards (reducing Consensus) in 
order to improve their employment prospects upon re-entry into the workforce.  It’s also possible 
that internal politics exist within the FASB which create a hierarchy or other dynamic that make 
it less likely for outgoing members to compromise with newer members. 
It appears that the SEC exerts a considerable amount of influence on the FASB during the 
hatching period, particularly in the areas of Thoroughness and Consensus.  These results are 
consistent with the more hands-on, pro-government ideals of the Democratic Party, which have 
the effect of improving Thoroughness, likely in the form of standard length, detail, number of 
examples, etc. while decreasing overall Consensus of the Board.   
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For the finalization period, results are qualitatively similar.  When examining the change 
in FASB funding and efficiency, Panel B shows a negative and significant association between 
IssuerAccSuppFees and Timeliness.  This suggests that the change from voluntary contributions 
to mandatory support fees may have decreased the response time and increased the life-cycle of 
standard generation, at least in the finalization period.  The observed coefficient for 
IssuerAccSuppFees and Throughness supports this decrease is efficiency but is not statistically 
significant.     
When examining the change in FASB voting and efficiency, the results are consistent 
with the hatching period.  The negative association between SimpleMjrty and Thoroughness and 
and SimpleMjrty and Consensus are quantitatively smaller in the finalization period, which 
suggests that once an agreed-upon Exposure Draft exists, the voting requirement matters 
somewhat less than in the hatching period.  It is interesting to again note the simple majority 
voting requirement does not appear to improve Timeliness, which directly contradicts its 
perceived advantage 
When professional and political characteristics are examined, I again find a positive and 
significant association between Accountant and Timeliness, which supports the idea that 
members with accounting backgrounds are able to issue standards more quickly.  It’s also 
possible that because these members have similar professional backgrounds, they are more likely 
to share similar ideologies, reducing the amount of time spent debating the specifics of standards.    
Similar to the hatching period, I find Tenure to be significantly, negatively associated 
with Thoroughness.  I also find more evidence supporting the idea that the SEC exerts some 
influence on the FASB, although to a lesser extent in the finalization period.    
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Overall, to summarize the key findings, it appears that the FASB funding change from 
voluntary contributions to mandatory accounting support fees and the change from super 
majority voting to simple majority voting are associated with decreases in FASB efficiency.  
Additionally, FASB members’ professional characteristics do appear to significantly influence 
the efficiency of the Board during the standard setting process.    
 
5.4 Robustness Tests and Limitations 
Because the sample size in this study is relatively limited, I conduct a jackknife 
procedure to test whether any single standard is driving the observed results.  Specifically, I 
successively eliminate each standard used in the regression, and then reconstruct all independent 
variables accordingly, in order to determine whether the statistical inferences from Table 5 
continue to hold.  I find the unreported results to be robust to the jackknife procedure, consistent 
with the assumption that no single standard is critical to my conclusions.   
Another potential issue relating to the limited sample size is that this study only includes 
data from FASB Pronouncements that were eventually approved – there is no available data for 
pronouncements that were generated and failed to gain the required number of votes for approval 
within the FASB29.  Any information relating to standards that were not approved by the FASB, 
such as passage time, voting records, constituent letters, etc., could provide additional insight and 
opportunity for future research. 
It is also possible that efficiency is endogenously influenced by the explanatory variables 
in the regression specification.  These endogeneity problems can confound the inferences drawn 
                                                
29 Due to the systematic standard setting process followed by the FASB, it is unusual for a 
standard that makes it to the final vote to fail to gain approval from the Board.  Board members 
are asked their opinions throughout the standard setting process, and their positions on these 
issues are typically known before a vote.  Issues that do not earn enough support to pass a vote 
are likely to be dropped (Pasewark, 2000).     
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from the FASB changes in funding, voting and Board member characteristics.  In unreported 
tests, I rerun the regressions from Table 5, lagging (leading) all explanatory variables by one 
year in order to mitigate these potential endogeneity concerns.  The lagging (leading) results are 
robust to this procedure.   
Other endogeneity concerns include the extent which the FAF may influence the standard 
setting process, since it’s possible that the FAF can make it easier or more difficult to generate 
(and successfully pass) standards.  Although prevented by its own bylaws from interfering with 
the standard setting work of the FASB, the FAF has the power to appoint and reappoint members 
to the Board, which allows the trustees indirect influence on the standard setting process in the 
long run.30,31  Therefore, “…it is at least theoretically possible that a Board member may modify 
a position on an issue to ensure reappointment…” (Miller et al. 1994). 
 
5.5 Future Research 
As there is limited empirical research on the accounting regulatory process, there are a 
number of potential extensions to the current paper.  One such extension is to study the effects of 
the funding change for the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) caused by the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.  Similar to SOX modifying the funding structure of the FASB, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 allows for GASB 
accounting support fees to be collected from broker dealers for the GASB (FAF, 2015).   
                                                
30 This is similar to the way the President of the United States may influence future decisions of 
the Supreme Court by appointing the Justices. 
31 For example, in 1990, when the FAF voted to increase the minimum number of votes needed 
for the FASB to adopt a Statement or issue an Exposure Draft from four to five, members of the 
accounting community felt the change stemmed from an external desire of the FAF to control the 
frequency of standards issued (Kirk 1990).   
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Another potential extension of the current paper is to study the effect of individual 
regulators on the regulatory process of another private-sector regulatory accounting body, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  The PCAOB was created by SOX and 
is responsible for overseeing the audits of public companies and issuers.  It would be interesting 
to see if the same professional and political affiliations that influence the efficiency of the FASB 
in the standard setting process are observed in the five-member PCAOB during its oversight 
process.       
An additional extension the present study is to examine the efficiency of the FASB in 
more recent years, specifically after the new Accounting Standards Codification became 
effective in 2009.  Around the same time, the FASB also spent a considerable amount of time 
and resources participating in the development of IFRS and working towards convergence with 
the IASB.  The effects of these major projects are not captured in the current study. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I examine how FASB organizational modifications and Board member characteristics 
influence the performance of the Board during the accounting standard setting process.  I find a 
negative relationship between the change in funding of the FASB and its standard setting 
efficiency, specifically in the area of Timeliness.  These results fail to provide justification for 
the change in the FASB funding mechanism from voluntary contributions to accounting support 
fees as mandated by SOX, and suggest the change may have negatively impacted accounting 
regulatory efficiency.  I also find evidence of a negative association between the simple majority 
voting requirement and FASB efficiency, particularly in the areas of Thoroughness and 
Consensus.  Additionally, Board member characteristics, particularly professional backgrounds 
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and political affiliations, do appear influence efficiency in accounting regulation.  Collectively, 
these results indicate that organizational changes made to the FASB and changes in Board 
member characteristics do impact the efficiency of the Board during the accounting standard 
setting process. 
These findings should be of interest to the FASB, its constituents, and the FAF, and may 
have potential policy implications.  Changes made to the FASB organizational structure could 
significantly affect future Accounting Standards Updates, Board negotiations, voting outcomes, 
Agenda items, etc.  It’s possible the extensive due process of the FASB is so onerous that it 
mitigates any attempts at improving the Board’s efficiency or that truncating the due process in 
some cases may lead to improvements in Thoroughness, Timeliness or Consensus.   
This study also provides evidence on the role of Board member characteristics in 
standard setting efficiency.  In addition to showing that the professional and political background 
of Board members matter during the standard setting process, I demonstrate that certain 
backgrounds may positively or negatively influence the standard setting process, in all three 
areas of efficiency, Thoroughness, Timeliness and Consensus.  To the extent that these member 
characteristics are desirable or undesirable, it’s possible for the FAF to adjust the efficiency of 
the FASB through future nominations and re-elections.  The current findings may also be of 
interest to other accounting regulatory agencies, such as the GASB, PCAOB, or IASB.      
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Table 1 
      Summary statistics of efficiency variables for the hatching and finalization periods 
 The sample is based on 166 SFAS issued between 1973 - 2008. 
  Panel A: Summary statistics for hatching period       
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnParaSupsd 166 1.01 0.69 1.06 0.00 4.58 
lnOthrIntPrn 166 0.26 0.00 0.48 0.00 2.94 
AgndaCmpltd 166 0.30** 0.29 0.08 0.11 0.50 
NumDocs 166 19.77*** 19.80 8.45 2.00 36.00 
lnNumPars 166 2.68 2.60 0.80 1.10 4.74 
lnWrdCnt 166 7.46 7.48 0.96 5.19 9.55 
ExmplsAppdx 166 2.39 0.00 4.75 0.00 35.00 
lnAppWrdCnt 166 7.90 8.32 2.49 0.00 11.64 
DisntVote 166 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.43 
UnanPass 166 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
lnCmntLtrs 166 4.46 4.38 1.11 0.00 9.56 
lnNumPapers 166 0.37 0.00 0.70 0.00 2.77 
PubHear 166 0.34 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
lnDaysAGtoED 166 6.35 6.63 1.08 1.39 8.57 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 166 6.72 6.88 0.87 3.93 8.73 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 166 5.23 5.29 0.90 0.00 7.03 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for finalization period       
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnParaSupsd 166 1.01 0.69 1.06 0.00 4.58 
lnOthrIntPrn 166 0.26 0.00 0.48 0.00 2.94 
AgndaCmpltd 166 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.50 
NumDocs 166 21.01 20.50 9.12 2.00 38.00 
lnNumPars 166 2.68 2.60 0.80 1.10 4.74 
lnWrdCnt 166 7.46 7.48 0.96 5.19 9.55 
ExmplsAppdx 166 2.39 0.00 4.75 0.00 35.00 
lnAppWrdCnt 166 7.90 8.32 2.49 0.00 11.64 
DisntVote 166 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.43 
UnanPass 166 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
lnCmntLtrs 166 4.46 4.38 1.11 0.00 9.56 
lnNumPapers 166 0.37 0.00 0.70 0.00 2.77 
PubHear 166 0.34 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
lnDaysAGtoED 166 6.35 6.63 1.08 1.39 8.57 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 166 6.72 6.88 0.87 3.93 8.73 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 166 5.23 5.29 0.90 0.00 7.03 
   
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Panel C: Correlation Matrix for hatching period
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) lnParaSupsd 1.00
(2) lnOthrIntPrn 0.34 1.00
(3) AgndaCmpltd -0.02 0.26 1.00
(4) NumDocs -0.11 0.02 0.49 1.00
(5) lnNumPars 0.70 0.28 -0.06 -0.11 1.00
(6) lnWrdCnt 0.62 0.26 -0.17 -0.16 0.87 1.00
(7) ExmplsAppdx 0.47 0.02 -0.13 -0.28 0.42 0.39 1.00
(8) lnAppWrdCnt 0.51 0.04 -0.29 -0.27 0.51 0.54 0.37 1.00
(9) DisntVote 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.10 1.00
(10) UnanPass -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.85 1.00
(11) lnCmntLtrs 0.45 0.19 -0.13 -0.23 0.48 0.41 0.33 0.45 0.30 -0.28 1.00
(12) lnNumPapers 0.55 0.32 0.04 -0.18 0.55 0.48 0.26 0.35 0.19 -0.16 0.52 1.00
(13) PubHear 0.59 0.27 -0.07 -0.21 0.60 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.27 -0.27 0.60 0.51 1.00
(14) lnDaysAGtoED 0.30 0.10 -0.11 -0.07 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.29 0.04 -0.08 0.20 0.20 0.16 1.00
(15) lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.36 0.08 -0.18 -0.09 0.43 0.42 0.26 0.38 0.08 -0.14 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.95 1.00
(16) lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.36 0.00 -0.21 -0.12 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.49 0.12 -0.18 0.43 0.20 0.38 0.44 0.64 1.00
Panel D: Correlation Matrix for finalization period
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) lnParaSupsd 1.00
(2) lnOthrIntPrn 0.34 1.00
(3) AgndaCmpltd -0.03 0.23 1.00
(4) NumDocs -0.10 0.07 0.26 1.00
(5) lnNumPars 0.70 0.28 -0.03 -0.11 1.00
(6) lnWrdCnt 0.62 0.26 -0.13 -0.11 0.87 1.00
(7) ExmplsAppdx 0.47 0.02 -0.12 -0.33 0.42 0.39 1.00
(8) lnAppWrdCnt 0.51 0.04 -0.24 -0.26 0.51 0.54 0.37 1.00
(9) DisntVote 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.10 1.00
(10) UnanPass -0.12 -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.85 1.00
(11) lnCmntLtrs 0.45 0.19 -0.07 -0.27 0.48 0.41 0.33 0.45 0.30 -0.28 1.00
(12) lnNumPapers 0.55 0.32 0.10 -0.18 0.55 0.48 0.26 0.35 0.19 -0.16 0.52 1.00
(13) PubHear 0.59 0.27 0.01 -0.18 0.60 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.27 -0.27 0.60 0.51 1.00
(14) lnDaysAGtoED 0.30 0.10 -0.18 -0.07 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.29 0.04 -0.08 0.20 0.20 0.16 1.00
(15) lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.36 0.08 -0.25 -0.06 0.43 0.42 0.26 0.38 0.08 -0.14 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.95 1.00
(16) lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.36 0.00 -0.24 -0.05 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.49 0.12 -0.18 0.43 0.20 0.38 0.44 0.64 1.00
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Table 2 
    Rotated factor analysis with 3 factors retained 
  Panel A: Factor analysis and factor loadings for hatching period 
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.341 1.853 0.440 0.440 
Factor2 2.489 0.624 0.252 0.693 
Factor3 1.864 . 0.189 0.882 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness  
lnParaSupsd 0.765 
  
0.382 
lnOthrIntPrn 
   
0.836 
AgndaCmpltd 
   
0.789 
NumDocs 
   
0.766 
lnNumPars 0.835 
  
0.244 
lnWrdCnt 0.768 
  
0.328 
ExmplsAppdx 
   
0.694 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.588 
  
0.543 
DisntVote 
  
0.840 0.242 
UnanPass 
  
-0.805 0.292 
lnCmntLtrs 0.652 
  
0.532 
lnNumPapers 0.661 
  
0.553 
PubHear 0.742 
  
0.426 
lnDaysAGtoED 
 
0.915 
 
0.150 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 
 
0.959 
 
0.033 
lnDaysEDtoISSU   0.589   0.496 
(blanks represent abs(loading)<.5) 
	 	 	 
Order in which variables contribute to factors (by size of 
loadings) 
Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: 
Thoroughness Timeliness  Consensus 
lnNumPars lnDaysAGtoISSU DisntVote 
lnWrdCnt lnDaysAGtoED UnanPass 
lnParaSupsd lnDaysEDtoISSU 
 PubHear 
  lnNumPapers 
  lnCmntLtrs 
  lnAppWrdCnt 
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Panel B: Factor analysis and factor loadings for finalization period 
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.316 1.814 0.449 0.449 
Factor2 2.502 0.691 0.260 0.709 
Factor3 1.811 . 0.188 0.898 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness  
lnParaSupsd 0.772 
  
0.373 
lnOthrIntPrn 
   
0.842 
AgndaCmpltd 
   
0.839 
NumDocs 
   
0.866 
lnNumPars 0.848 
  
0.229 
lnWrdCnt 0.774 
  
0.329 
ExmplsAppdx 
   
0.677 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.587 
  
0.553 
DisntVote 
  
0.866 0.224 
UnanPass 
  
-0.858 0.238 
lnCmntLtrs 0.641 
  
0.529 
lnNumPapers 0.663 
  
0.545 
PubHear 0.728 
  
0.428 
lnDaysAGtoED 
 
0.900 
 
0.171 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 
 
0.950 
 
0.041 
lnDaysEDtoISSU   0.597   0.489 
(blanks represent abs(loading)<.5) 
	 	 	 
Order (by size of loadings) in which variables contribute to factors  
Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: 
 Thoroughness Timeliness  Consensus 
 lnNumPars lnDaysAGtoISSU DisntVote 
 lnWrdCnt lnDaysAGtoED UnanPass 
 lnParaSupsd lnDaysEDtoISSU 
  PubHear 
   lnNumPapers 
   lnCmntLtrs 
   lnAppWrdCnt 
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Table 3 
      Analysis of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards  
Panel A: SFAS timelines          
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
DaysAGtoED 166 879 755 799 4 5279 
DaysAGtoISSU 166 1135 973 894 51 6209 
DaysEDtoISSU 166 257 198 209 0 1126 
 
 
Panel B: 
 
Figure 1.  Days from Agenda date to ED date (hatching period):  
 
    
 
 
Figure 2.  Days from ED date to issue date (finalization period): 
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Panel C: Frequency Distribution of SFAS 
 
Year 
# SFAS Initiated 
(Agenda Year) Percent 
# SFAS Completed 
(Issue Year) Percent 
1973 10 6.02 1 0.60 
1974 6 3.61 2 1.20 
1975 6 3.61 9 5.42 
1976 11 6.63 2 1.20 
1977 4 2.41 6 3.61 
1978 17 10.24 4 2.41 
1979 14 8.43 10 6.02 
1980 4 2.41 10 6.02 
1981 6 3.61 9 5.42 
1982 7 4.22 18 10.84 
1983 5 3.01 7 4.22 
1984 6 3.61 4 2.41 
1985 5 3.01 6 3.61 
1986 10 6.02 3 1.81 
1987 2 1.20 6 3.61 
1988 3 1.81 4 2.41 
1989 5 3.01 3 1.81 
1990 0 0.00 2 1.20 
1991 1 0.60 2 1.20 
1992 3 1.81 5 3.01 
1993 4 2.41 4 2.41 
1994 3 1.81 2 1.20 
1995 3 1.81 5 3.01 
1996 7 4.22 3 1.81 
1997 3 1.81 4 2.41 
1998 3 1.81 3 1.81 
1999 0 0.00 3 1.81 
2000 1 0.60 3 1.81 
2001 3 1.81 4 2.41 
2002 5 3.01 4 2.41 
2003 5 3.01 3 1.81 
2004 2 1.20 4 2.41 
2005 2 1.20 1 0.60 
2006 0 0.00 4 2.41 
2007 0 0.00 3 1.81 
2008 0 0.00 3 1.81 
Total 166 100.00 166 100.00 
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Panel D: SFAS Themes
Standard themes are classified using the 23 mutually exclusive themes identified by Wallace (2001).
A single classification is selected for each SFAS, according to the primary thrust of the statement.
Theme SFAS #
# of SFAS in Theme 
Category
Specialized Practices/Industry Guidance
19, 32, 50, 51, 53, 60, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 90, 92, 101, 113, 
120, 122, 143, 146, 151, 152, 153, 162, 163 26
Debt and Securitizations
4, 6, 15, 47, 49, 64, 76, 77, 78, 84, 105, 114, 118, 125, 129, 134, 
140, 156 18
Pensions and Other Compensation
35, 36, 43, 74, 81, 87, 88, 106, 110, 112, 123, 132, 123R, 132R, 
148, 158 16
Marketable Securities, Derivatives, and Hedging 12, 20, 80, 107, 115, 119, 133, 138, 149, 150, 155, 157, 159, 161 14
Leases 13, 17, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 91, 98 10
Changing Prices 33, 39, 40, 41, 46, 54, 70, 82, 89 9
Deferrals 59, 75, 99, 100, 103, 108, 127, 137 8
Business Combinations 10, 72, 94, 141, 141R, 147, 160 7
Research and Development 2, 7, 44, 68, 86, 142 6
Income Taxes 9, 31, 37, 96, 109 5
Accounting Changes/Prior Period Adjustments 3, 16, 56, 83, 154 5
Segments and Major Customers 14, 18, 24, 30, 131 5
Not-for-Profits 93, 116, 117, 124, 136 5
Exclusion of Certain Groups from Reporting 21, 25, 79, 102, 126 5
Revenue Recognition 45, 48, 66, 97 4
EPS and Comprehensive Income 55, 85, 128, 130 4
Capitalization of Interest 34, 42, 58, 62 4
Rescission/Elimination 111, 135, 139, 145 4
Contingencies 5, 11, 38 3
Foreign Currency 1, 8, 52 3
Cash Flow 95, 104 2
Impairment of Long-lived Assets 121, 144 2
Related Party Disclosures 57 1
Total 166
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Table 4 
      Summary statistics for hatching and finalization periods       
Panel A: Hatching period           
 Variable n Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Thoroughness 166 0.00 -0.23 0.96 -1.83 2.50 
Timeliness 166 0.00 0.19 0.98 -3.40 2.28 
Consensus 166 0.00 -0.10 0.93 -1.73 1.84 
IssuerAccSuppFees 166 0.05*** 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.68 
SimpleMjrty 166 0.67** 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Accountant 166 0.71** 0.71 0.07 0.57 0.86 
RepMember 166 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.38 
Tenure 166 4.40*** 4.64 1.29 1.00 6.43 
PctReElect 166 0.06** 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.14 
PctTermEnd 166 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.43 
PctDemSEC 166 0.46 0.45 0.15 0.00 0.75 
DemInflnce 166 1.71*** 2.00 0.85 0.00 3.00 
 
 
Panel B: Finalization period           
Variable n Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Thoroughness 166 0.00 -0.24 0.96 -1.74 2.70 
Timeliness 166 0.00 0.20 0.98 -3.36 2.28 
Consensus 166 0.00 0.13 0.93 -1.73 1.67 
IssuerAccSuppFees 166 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.70 
SimpleMjrty 166 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Accountant 166 0.70 0.71 0.07 0.49 0.86 
RepMember 166 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.43 
Tenure 166 4.71 5.00 1.34 1.00 6.71 
PctReElect 166 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.29 
PctTermEnd 166 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.43 
PctDemSEC 166 0.45 0.45 0.17 0.00 0.75 
DemInflnce 166 1.51 1.00 0.84 0.00 3.00 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix for hatching period regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Thoroughness 1.00
(2) Timeliness 0.03 1.00
(3) Consensus 0.01 0.00 1.00
(4) IssuerAccSuppFees 0.06 0.08 -0.24 1.00
(5) SimpleMjrty -0.27 -0.07 0.25 0.21 1.00
(6) Accountant -0.01 -0.23 0.15 -0.01 -0.20 1.00
(7) RepMember -0.11 0.11 -0.19 0.05 0.10 -0.27 1.00
(8) Tenure -0.17 0.16 -0.02 -0.20 0.04 -0.48 0.39 1.00
(9) PctReElect 0.00 0.17 -0.20 0.44 -0.11 -0.11 0.06 0.13 1.00
(10) PctTermEnd 0.16 0.00 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.28 1.00
(11) PctDemSEC -0.16 -0.06 0.22 -0.14 0.25 0.19 0.54 0.12 -0.17 -0.24 1.00
(12) DemInflnce -0.13 -0.07 0.36 -0.58 -0.04 0.19 -0.40 -0.16 -0.27 -0.45 0.16 1.00
Panel D: Correlation Matrix for finalization period regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Thoroughness 1.00
(2) Timeliness 0.03 1.00
(3) Consensus 0.02 0.01 1.00
(4) IssuerAccSuppFees 0.01 0.18 -0.20 1.00
(5) SimpleMjrty -0.18 -0.02 0.16 0.22 1.00
(6) Accountant 0.02 -0.24 -0.01 -0.15 -0.46 1.00
(7) RepMember -0.02 0.14 -0.10 -0.07 0.07 -0.19 1.00
(8) Tenure -0.24 0.20 0.03 -0.22 0.01 -0.19 0.15 1.00
(9) PctReElect -0.13 0.20 -0.15 0.31 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17 0.27 1.00
(10) PctTermEnd 0.10 0.17 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0.20 0.16 -0.13 1.00
(11) PctDemSEC -0.09 -0.09 0.17 -0.14 0.16 0.09 0.59 -0.02 -0.25 -0.22 1.00
(12) DemInflnce 0.03 -0.20 0.23 -0.44 -0.18 0.11 -0.37 -0.25 -0.20 -0.42 -0.01 1.00
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Table 5 
     
  
OLS regression results for hatching and finalization periods     
 Panel A: Hatching period           
 
Factor 1  
(Thoroughness) 
One-tailed 
significance 
Factor 2  
(Timeliness) 
One-tailed 
significance 
Factor 3  
(Consensus) 
One-tailed 
significance 
IssuerAccSuppFees 0.14 
 
-1.10 * 0.67 
 
 
(0.21) 
 
(-1.47) 
 
(1.08) 
 SimpleMjrty -0.72*** *** 0.31 ** -0.49*** *** 
 
(-4.08) 
 
(1.63) 
 
(-3.10) 
 Accountant -3.97*** *** 3.34** *** -0.46 
 
 
(-2.81) 
 
(2.19) 
 
(-0.36) 
 RepMember -4.02** *** -0.78 
 
4.66*** *** 
 
(-2.46) 
 
(-0.44) 
 
(3.18) 
 Tenure -0.17** *** -0.06 
 
-0.07 
 
 
(-2.36) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-1.08) 
 PctReElect 0.27 
 
-2.53 
 
-1.10 
 
 
(0.13) 
 
(-1.15) 
 
(-0.60) 
 PctTermEnd 2.15* ** -1.26 
 
-2.09* ** 
 
(1.75) 
 
(-0.95) 
 
(-1.88) 
 PctDemSEC 1.71** ** -0.13 
 
-2.25*** *** 
 
(2.00) 
 
(-0.14) 
 
(-2.91) 
 DemInflnce -0.22 * -0.21 * -0.22 ** 
 
(-1.53) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(-1.70) 
 _cons 3.91*** *** -1.43 
 
1.98* ** 
 
(3.40) 
 
(-1.15) 
 
(1.91) 
 No. Obs. 166 
 
166 
 
166 
 R2 0.18 
 
0.10 
 
0.30 
 VIF 2.38           
Significance levels (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level, using a two-tailed test, t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses, VIF reports mean variance inflation factor.  
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Panel B: Finalization period           
 
Factor 1  
(Thoroughness) 
One-tailed 
significance 
Factor 2  
(Timeliness) 
One-tailed 
significance 
Factor 3  
(Consensus) 
One-tailed 
significance 
IssuerAccSuppFees -0.24 
 
-0.94* ** 0.55 
 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(1.17) 
 SimpleMjrty -0.52*** *** 0.30 * -0.38** ** 
 
(-2.66) 
 
(1.51) 
 
(-2.04) 
 Accountant -2.13 * 3.02** *** 0.34 
 
 
(-1.6) 
 
(2.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 RepMember -0.53 
 
-1.71 * 3.04** *** 
 
(-0.40) 
 
(-1.30) 
 
(2.44) 
 Tenure -0.21*** *** -0.10 * -0.06 
 
 
(-3.08) 
 
(-1.52) 
 
(-1.00) 
 PctReElect -1.07 
 
-2.13 * 0.83 
 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-1.55) 
 
(0.64) 
 PctTermEnd 0.83 
 
-1.39 * -0.95 
 
 
(0.84) 
 
(-1.40) 
 
(-1.01) 
 PctDemSEC -0.09 
 
0.27 
 
-1.67*** *** 
 
(-0.14) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(-2.67) 
 DemInflnce -0.11 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.19 * 
 
(-0.82) 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(-1.52) 
 _cons 3.11*** *** -1.21 
 
0.93 
 
 
(2.55) 
 
(-1.00) 
 
(0.81) 
 No. Obs. 166 
 
166 
 
166 
 R2 0.13 
 
0.18 
 
0.18 
 VIF 1.92           
Significance levels (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level, using a two-tailed test, t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses, VIF reports mean variance inflation factor.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions and Collection Process for Factor Analysis 
1. Accuracy of work performed: 
a. lnParaSupsd – The natural log of the number of paragraphs in a standard 
superseded by subsequent pronouncements.  This is collected from the FASB 
website, under the “Status” of each superseded standard.   
b. lnOthrIntPrn – The natural log of the number of other Interpretive 
Pronouncements issued by the FASB in order to “…clarify, explain, or elaborate 
on” an existing standard.  This is collected from the FASB website, under the 
“Status” of each superseded standard.    
2. Quantity of work performed: 
a. NumDocs – The total number of Documents issued by the FASB each year.  This 
is obtained from the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Annual Reports 
from 1980-2008.  Each report contains a list of FASB Documents Issued during 
the year.  Documents issued include Statements of Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFACs), Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFASs), 
Interpretations, Exposure Drafts (EDs), Proposed Interpretations, Discussion 
Memorandums and Other. 
3. Quality of worked performed: 
a. lnWrdCnt – The natural log of the word count for the body of each standard 
(excluding the appendices, title page and contents page).  All superseded 
standards are available through the Reference Library on the FASB website. 
b. lnNumPar – The natural log of the number of paragraphs of contained in the body 
of each standard (excluding the appendices, title page, and contents page).  All 
superseded standards are available through the Reference Library on the FASB 
website.   
c. ExmplsAppdx – The number of examples provided for guidance in the appendix 
of each standard.  All superseded standards are available through the Reference 
Library on the FASB website. 
d. lnAppWrdCnt – The natural log of the word count of the appendix of each 
standard.  All superseded standards are available through the Reference Library 
on the FASB website. 
e. DisntVote – The percentage of dissenting votes for each standard.  The vote count 
for every standard is provided in the body of the SFAS.  All superseded standards 
are available through the Reference Library on the FASB website. 
f. UnanPass – Indicator variable equal to one if a standard was passed by a 
unanimous vote and zero otherwise.  The vote count for each standard is provided 
in the body of the SFAS.  All superseded standards are available through the 
Reference Library on the FASB website.   
4. Operating Efficiency 
a. AgndaCmpltd – The percentage of items completed on the FASB Technical 
Agenda in the year a standard was passed.  The Technical Agenda is published by 
the FASB quarterly in the Status Report (pre 2/28/2002) and the FASB Report 
(post 2/28/2002)32.  An item is considered “completed” when a standard is issued.  
                                                
32Interpretation of the Technical Agenda requires some judgment, particularly in the earlier 
portion of my sample period.  In some cases, items are removed from the Agenda with no 
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Agenda items that are dropped or combined with other items are not considered 
completed.     
5. Client satisfaction   
a. lnCmntLtrs – The natural log of the number of Exposure Draft comment letters 
written by constituents for each standard.  This approximate number of comment 
letters is disclosed in the appendix of each standard.  All superseded standards are 
available through the Reference Library on the FASB website.   
b. PubHear – Indicator variable equal to one if there was a public hearing during the 
due process before a standard was issued.  The incidence of a public hearing is 
disclosed in the appendix of a standard.  All superseded standards are available 
through the Reference Library on the FASB website.         
c. lnNumPapers – The natural log of 1+ the total number of academic papers 
published in any of the top three accounting journals (JAR, JAE and TAR) 
analyzing or discussing the impact of a standard. 
6. Timeliness in meeting delivery schedule:  
a. lnDaysAGtoED – The natural log of the number of days from the placement of an 
issue on the Technical Agenda to the issuance of an Exposure Draft.  The Agenda 
date is provided in the Appendix for most standards, and estimated for those with 
no specific date provided33.  The Agenda date is often provided in MM/YYYY 
form, so I assume items are added to the Agenda in the middle of the month (the 
15th day) in order to calculate the number of days from Agenda placement to 
Exposure Draft issuance.  The ED date is obtained from the Appendix of each 
standard.  All superseded standards are available through the Reference Library 
on the FASB website.          
b. lnDaysAGtoISSU – The natural log of the number of days from the placement of 
an issue on the Agenda to the issuance of a completed standard.   Issue dates are 
provided in each standard in MM/YYYY format, so I assume standards are issued 
in the middle of the month (the 15th day) for my calculations.  All superseded 
standards are available through the Reference Library on the FASB website. 
c. lnDaysEDtoISSU – The natural log of the number of days from the issuance of an 
Exposure Draft to the issuance of the completed standard.  The ED date is 
obtained from the Appendix of each standard, and the issue date is obtained from 
the body of each standard.  All superseded standards are available through the 
Reference Library on the FASB website. 
   
                                                                                                                                                       
discussion or explanation without being completed.  In other cases, related Agenda items are 
combined into a single category, or a single item is split into multiple Agenda topics.  
Additionally, the names of some Agenda items are adjusted from one period to the next, which 
obfuscates the tracking process.     
33Some standards are issued to amend/improve upon previous pronouncements.  For those 
standards, I use the issuance of the previous standard as the Agenda placement date.  For 
example, SFAS 39, was issued on 10/15/80 as a supplement to SFAS 33.  In this case, I use the 
issue date of SFAS 33 (9/15/1979) as the “Agenda date” for SFAS 39.  For standards with no 
Agenda date provided and no discernable estimate, I use the average number of days from 
Agenda placement to Exposure Draft to estimate the Agenda date.  
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Appendix B 
Unrotated Factor Analysis 
 
Table B1 
    Unrotated factor analysis for hatching and finalization periods 
 Panel A: Unrotated factor analysis for hatching period   
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 5.291 3.381 0.536 0.536 
Factor2 1.910 0.416 0.194 0.730 
Factor3 1.494 0.541 0.152 0.882 
Factor4 0.953 0.513 0.097 0.978 
Factor5 0.440 0.143 0.045 1.023 
Factor6 0.297 0.135 0.030 1.053 
Factor7 0.162 0.116 0.017 1.069 
Factor8 0.047 0.022 0.005 1.074 
Factor9 0.024 0.036 0.003 1.076 
Factor10 -0.012 0.019 -0.001 1.075 
Factor11 -0.031 0.051 -0.003 1.072 
Factor12 -0.082 0.027 -0.008 1.064 
Factor13 -0.109 0.013 -0.011 1.053 
Factor14 -0.123 0.015 -0.013 1.040 
Factor15 -0.138 0.119 -0.014 1.026 
Factor16 -0.258 . -0.026 1.000 
 
Factor loadings and unique variances of factors with eigenvalues > 1  
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3   
lnParaSupsd 0.753 
  
0.382 
lnOthrIntPrn 
   
0.836 
AgndaCmpltd 
 
0.425 
 
0.789 
NumDocs 
 
0.358 
 
0.766 
lnNumPars 0.838 
  
0.244 
lnWrdCnt 0.792 
  
0.328 
ExmplsAppdx 0.483 
  
0.694 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.656 
  
0.543 
DisntVote 
 
0.799 
 
0.242 
UnanPass 
 
-0.746 
 
0.292 
lnCmntLtrs 0.650 
  
0.532 
lnNumPapers 0.603 
  
0.553 
PubHear 0.696 
  
0.426 
lnDaysAGtoED 0.560 
 
0.678 0.150 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.669 
 
0.667 0.033 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.638     0.496 
 (blanks represent abs(loading)<.3) 
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 Panel B: Unrotated factor analysis for finalization 
period   
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 5.273 3.416 0.549 0.549 
Factor2 1.857 0.358 0.193 0.742 
Factor3 1.499 0.683 0.156 0.898 
Factor4 0.816 0.343 0.085 0.983 
Factor5 0.473 0.203 0.049 1.032 
Factor6 0.270 0.142 0.028 1.060 
Factor7 0.127 0.076 0.013 1.073 
Factor8 0.051 0.057 0.005 1.079 
Factor9 -0.006 0.019 -0.001 1.078 
Factor10 -0.025 0.012 -0.003 1.075 
Factor11 -0.038 0.034 -0.004 1.071 
Factor12 -0.072 0.034 -0.007 1.064 
Factor13 -0.106 0.019 -0.011 1.053 
Factor14 -0.124 0.022 -0.013 1.040 
Factor15 -0.146 0.091 -0.015 1.025 
Factor16 -0.238 . -0.025 1.000 
 
Factor loadings and unique variances of factors with eigenvalues > 1  
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness 
lnParaSupsd 0.755 
  
0.373 
lnOthrIntPrn 
   
0.842 
AgndaCmpltd 
 
0.365 
 
0.839 
NumDocs 
   
0.866 
lnNumPars 0.838 
  
0.229 
lnWrdCnt 0.789 
  
0.329 
ExmplsAppdx 0.486 
  
0.677 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.653 
  
0.553 
DisntVote 
 
0.746 -0.394 0.224 
UnanPass 
 
-0.704 0.441 0.238 
lnCmntLtrs 0.651 
  
0.529 
lnNumPapers 0.603 
  
0.545 
PubHear 0.693 
  
0.428 
lnDaysAGtoED 0.563 -0.413 -0.585 0.171 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.671 -0.400 -0.591 0.041 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.635     0.489 
(blanks represent abs(loading)<.3) 
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Panel C: Scree plot of Eigenvectors: 
 
Hatching period:  
      
                      
 
Finalization period: 
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Panel D: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for hatching period 
 
Variable KMO 
lnParaSupsd 0.89 
lnOthrIntPrn 0.74 
AgndaCmpltd 0.55 
NumDocs 0.66 
lnNumPars 0.81 
lnWrdCnt 0.81 
ExmplsAppdx 0.87 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.91 
DisntVote 0.59 
UnanPass 0.60 
lnCmntLtrs 0.88 
lnNumPapers 0.91 
PubHear 0.91 
lnDaysAGtoED 0.54 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.60 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.65 
Overall 0.75 
     
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for finalization period  
 
Variable KMO 
lnParaSupsd 0.880 
lnOthrIntPrn 0.784 
AgndaCmpltd 0.593 
NumDocs 0.668 
lnNumPars 0.812 
lnWrdCnt 0.806 
ExmplsAppdx 0.865 
lnAppWrdCnt 0.900 
DisntVote 0.585 
UnanPass 0.592 
lnCmntLtrs 0.879 
lnNumPapers 0.915 
PubHear 0.919 
lnDaysAGtoED 0.551 
lnDaysAGtoISSU 0.603 
lnDaysEDtoISSU 0.660 
Overall 0.758 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1 
 Variable Definitions  
Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
 F1 – Thoroughness Retained factor from factor analysis.  
F2 – Timeliness Retained factor from factor analysis. 
F3 – Consensus Retained factor from factor analysis.  
 
FASB Mechanisms 
 
IssuerAccSuppFees 
Standard-level measure of the total dollar amount of mandatory accounting support fees 
paid to FASB by issuers of securities, as a percentage of total operating revenue. 
SimpleMjrty 
Standard-level indicator variable equal to one if a standard was passed in a year where the 
FASB requires a simple majority vote, and zero otherwise.   
 
FASB Member Characteristics 
Accountant 
Standard-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent 
former employ in public accounting or financial statement/return preparation. 
RepMember 
Standard-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign 
contributions to the Republican party or candidates. 
Tenure Standard-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. 
PctReElect 
Standard-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members who are up for re-
election. 
PctTermEnd 
Standard-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members who are in their 
terminal year of service. 
 
Other 
 
PctDemSEC 
Standard-level measure of the proportion of SEC Commissioners affiliated with 
Democratic Party. 
DemInflnce 
Standard-level measure of the political affiliation of the Senate, House of Representatives, 
and President.  Each component = 1 if a Democratic majority exists, for a max of 3 and a 
minimum of zero.    
 
All Board mechanism and member characteristics are averaged over the hatching and finalization periods for each 
Standard. 
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Appendix D 
FASB Financial Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D1:
Sources of FASB Financial Support
Year
Public 
Accounting % Other* %
Contributed 
Services %
Accounting 
Support Fees % Total
Since 1972 6,065,950   0.51 5,806,344  0.49 -             -   -               -   11,872,294 
1975 2,059,076   0.50 2,070,125  0.50 -             -   -               -   4,129,201   
1976 -              0.00 -            -  -             -   -               -   3,772,327   
1977 -              0.00 -            -  -             -   -               -   4,077,723   
1978 1,864,000   0.43 2,444,000  0.57 -             -   -               -   4,308,000   
1979 1,875,000   0.40 2,762,000  0.60 -             -   -               -   4,637,000   
1980 1,895,000   0.38 3,105,000  0.62 -             -   -               -   5,000,000   
1981 1,738,000   0.35 3,245,000  0.65 -             -   -               -   4,983,000   
1982 1,949,000   0.36 3,459,000  0.64 -             -   -               -   5,408,000   
1983 2,221,000   0.39 3,519,000  0.61 -             -   -               -   5,740,000   
1984 2,230,000   0.40 3,387,000  0.60 -             -   -               -   5,617,000   
1985 2,411,000   0.41 3,412,000  0.59 -             -   -               -   5,823,000   
1986 2,583,000   0.44 3,253,000  0.56 -             -   -               -   5,836,000   
1987 2,774,000   0.46 3,230,000  0.54 -             -   -               -   6,004,000   
1988 2,884,000   0.49 3,047,000  0.51 -             -   -               -   5,931,000   
1989 2,805,000   0.46 3,253,000  0.54 -             -   -               -   6,058,000   
1990 3,113,000   0.49 3,237,000  0.51 -             -   -               -   6,350,000   
1991 3,091,000   0.48 3,373,000  0.52 -             -   -               -   6,464,000   
1992 3,296,000   0.49 3,379,000  0.51 -             -   -               -   6,675,000   
1993 3,337,000   0.51 3,190,000  0.49 -             -   -               -   6,527,000   
1994 3,479,000   0.53 3,044,000  0.47 -             -   -               -   6,523,000   
1995 3,488,000   0.55 2,870,000  0.45 -             -   -               -   6,358,000   
1996 3,498,000   0.55 2,852,000  0.45 -             -   -               -   6,350,000   
1997 3,656,000   0.56 2,725,000  0.41 201,000     0.03 -               -   6,582,000   
1998 3,637,000   0.56 2,612,000  0.40 220,000     0.03 -               -   6,469,000   
1999 3,664,000   0.58 2,424,000  0.38 280,000     0.04 -               -   6,368,000   
2000 3,608,000   0.57 2,548,000  0.40 158,000     0.03 -               -   6,314,000   
2001 3,544,000   0.54 2,940,000  0.44 140,000     0.02 -               -   6,624,000   
2002 2,463,000   0.46 2,551,000  0.48 291,000     0.05 -               -   5,305,000   
2003 2,463,000   0.10 2,561,000  0.10 263,000     0.01 19,161,000  0.78 24,448,000 
2004 -              0.00 -            -  123,000     0.00 25,355,000  1.00 25,478,000 
2005 -              0.00 -            -  48,000       0.00 20,225,000  1.00 20,273,000 
2006 -              0.00 -            -  56,000       0.00 22,436,000  1.00 22,492,000 
2007 -              0.00 -            -  101,000     0.00 22,514,000  1.00 22,615,000 
2008 -              0.00 -            -  110,000     0.00 22,759,000  1.00 22,869,000 
 *Includes investment firms, constituent organizations, banks and industry and other
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Figure D1: 
 
 
Figure D2: 
 
 
Figure D3: 
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Table E1
FASB Member Professional Backgrounds 
Year % Public Accounting %Preparer %User %Academic %Regulator Total Accountant Non-Accountant
1973 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.14
1974 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.14
1975 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.14
1976 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.14
1977 0.57 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1978 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1979 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1980 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1981 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1982 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1983 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1984 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1985 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1986 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1987 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1988 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1989 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1990 0.43 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
1991 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1992 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.29
1993 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1994 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1995 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1996 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1997 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1998 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
1999 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2000 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2001 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2002 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2003 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2004 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2005 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2006 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.29
2007 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.57 0.43
2008 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.40 0.60
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Table E2 
    Political Affiliation of FASB Members     
Year %Democrat %Republican %No Affiliation Total 
1973 0.14 - 0.86 1.00 
1974 0.29 - 0.71 1.00 
1975 0.29 - 0.71 1.00 
1976 0.29 0.14 0.57 1.00 
1977 0.29 0.14 0.57 1.00 
1978 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1979 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1980 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1981 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1982 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1983 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1984 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1985 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 
1986 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1987 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1988 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1989 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1990 - - 1.00 1.00 
1991 - - 1.00 1.00 
1992 - - 1.00 1.00 
1993 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1994 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1995 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
1996 - 0.29 0.71 1.00 
1997 - 0.29 0.71 1.00 
1998 - 0.29 0.71 1.00 
1999 - 0.43 0.57 1.00 
2000 - 0.43 0.57 1.00 
2001 0.14 0.29 0.57 1.00 
2002 0.14 0.29 0.57 1.00 
2003 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
2004 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
2005 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
2006 - 0.14 0.86 1.00 
2007 - - 1.00 1.00 
2008 - 0.20 0.80 1.00 
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Appendix F 
FASB Dissenting Votes 
 
Table E1 
   Number of Dissenting Votes in Standard Issuance 
Dissenting Votes Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 80 48.19 48.19 
1 34 20.48 68.67 
2 32 19.28 87.95 
3 20 12.05 100.00 
 
 
Figure F1:  
Dissenting Votes in Standard Issuance 
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